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Abstract
Background: Physicians who perform unsafe practices and harm patients may be disciplined. In Norway, there are
five types of disciplinary action, ranging from a warning for the least serious examples of malpractice to loss of
licence for the most serious ones. Disciplinary actions always involve medical malpractice. The aims of this study
were to investigate the frequency and distribution of disciplinary actions by the Norwegian Board of Health
Supervision for doctors in Norway and to uncover nation-wide patient safety issues.
Methods: We retrospectively investigated all 953 disciplinary actions for doctors given by the Board between 2011
and 2018. We categorized these according to type of action, recipient’s profession, organizational factors and
geographical location of the recipient. Frequencies, cross tables, rates and linear regression were used for statistical
analysis.
Results: Rural general practitioners received the most disciplinary actions of all doctors and had their licence
revoked or restricted 2.1 times more frequently than urban general practitioners. General practitioners and private
specialists received respectively 98.7 and 91.0 disciplinary actions per 1000 doctors. Senior consultants and junior
doctors working in hospitals received respectively 17.0 and 6.4 disciplinary actions per 1000 doctors. Eight times
more actions were received by primary care doctors than secondary care doctors. Doctors working in primary care
were given a warning 10.6 times more often and had their licence revoked or restricted 4.6 times more often than
those in secondary care.
Conclusion: The distribution and frequency of disciplinary actions by the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision
clearly varied according to type of health care facility. Private specialists and general practitioners, especially those
working in rural clinics, received the most disciplinary actions. These results deserve attention from health policy-
makers and warrant further studies to determine the factors that influence medical malpractice. Moreover, the
supervisory authorities should assess whether their procedures for reacting to malpractice are efficient and
adequate for all types of physicians working in Norway.
Keywords: Patient safety, Rural practice, Primary care, Secondary care, Medical litigation system, Disciplinary action,
Medical malpractice
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Background
Patients affected by medical malpractice experience in-
creased morbidity and mortality [1–3]. Unsafe medical
practices, where patients are harmed by the medical care
system designed to help them, are prevalent in both pri-
mary and specialized care [3–7] and the associated emo-
tional and financial costs are substantial [1, 2, 8].
Medical litigation systems in different countries that ad-
dress cases of malpractice by physicians vary in form [9–
11]. However, the medico-legal principles are universal
in that patients or their relatives must express a concern
or file a complaint about a physician or a health institu-
tion. In order to be disciplined, the physician must,
through his or her medical conduct, have provided sub-
standard or negligent care that led, or could have led, to
patient harm [9, 10, 12]. In Norway, this process is the
responsibility of the National Board of Health Supervi-
sion (NBHS), which receives the most serious patient
complaints and assesses whether a doctor should be dis-
ciplined. Unlike the litigation system in the United
States, decisions by the NBHS do not award financial
compensation to patients, and the NBHS assesses only
the legal aspect, i.e. whether the health care provider is
responsible according to health care legislation. In a few
rare and extraordinary cases, civil courts also impose
additional legal penalties.
Most recent studies aiming to determine the causes
that led to disciplinary actions analysed types of medical
error [9, 13] and characteristics of physicians (sex, age,
profession and work experience) in relation to such ac-
tions [13, 14]. Based on the perspectives of Reason [15]
and Donabedian [16] regarding quality and errors in
health care, factors such as system design, organizational
culture and lack of management or training can create
‘latent’ upstream errors that in the end cause ‘active’ pa-
tient harm. The factors involved can be external factors
that are not under the control of a medical institution
(e.g. geographical, political or cultural issues) or
organizational factors (structure, organizational culture,
working conditions) [17]. To discipline only individual
doctors for mistakes created by these factors is not lo-
gical because errors are bound to continue until the
underlying conditions are remedied. There are some in-
dications that suggest that doctors who work in general
practice receive more complaints than those who work
in hospitals [18]. A Danish retrospective register study
did not establish any relationship between general prac-
titioner (GP) location (urban or rural) and the occur-
rence of malpractice complaints [19]. An Australian
cohort study found a higher risk for complaints in re-
mote areas in Australia than in urban areas [20]. The
scarce evidence on the influence of external and
organizational factors on medical malpractice warrants
greater attention because a thorough evaluation might
reveal important implications for improving patient
safety. Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate
these factors and descriptive data of all doctors in
Norway disciplined between 2011 and 2018.
Methods
In this retrospective descriptive study, we analysed the
frequency, trends, total and geographical distribution,
rates and organizational factors of all doctors in Norway
who were disciplined between 2011 and 2018. The data-
set consisted of all disciplinary actions given to doctors
in Norway. When dealing with whole population data-
sets, observed differences are considered de facto
differences.
The medical litigation system in Norway
In Norway, several acts regulate how patients, family
members, health care personnel and health authorities
can or must report medical malpractice to the NBHS.
The event must have resulted in death or an unexpected
serious outcome. Reported cases are usually first
assessed by the local NBHS representative, the chief
county medical officer. If the reported violation is ser-
ious and potentially irresponsible [12], the case is for-
warded to the NBHS [21]. Figure 1 presents a flowchart
of the reporting process.
There are five potential disciplinary actions; a warning
is the least serious and having one’s licence revoked or
suspended is the strongest form of action [12], see Fig. 1.
The most frequent and serious patterns of violations by
physicians include sexual misconduct, failure to meet
the required standard of care and unprofessional con-
duct [9, 12, 13].
The Norwegian health care system
In Norway, all inhabitants can choose their own local
regular GP [22]. More than 4700 doctors are currently
working as regular GPs [23], and are part of a patient list
system which enables an enduring patient-GP relation-
ship [24]. GPs are usually self-employed [25] and often
share a local clinic with a few colleagues. Over half of
Norway’s GP clinics are classified as rural [24]. For many
of those living in rural areas, it takes more than 40 min
to reach a local emergency primary care clinic [26], and
substantially longer to reach a hospital. Physicians work-
ing in hospitals are employed by regional health author-
ities (state enterprises). There are four regional health
authorities, which are responsible for 39 hospitals and
over 12,900 physicians [27] (2018 figure). Hospitals pro-
vide the public with free specialized treatment. There
are university hospitals, regional hospitals and smaller
local hospitals that serve the inhabitants of a local area.
In addition, there are almost 1000 private specialists
working in Norway. They work in their own private
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facilities and provide specialist outpatient diagnostics
that are almost equivalent to hospital diagnostics. The
private specialists receive subsidies from the regional
health authorities but are self-employed [28].
Sample
The sample consisted of all disciplinary actions given to
doctors in Norway between 1 January 2011 and 31 De-
cember 2018. After submitting a formal application to
the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (project
#53124) and a formal request to the NBHS, we were
allowed access to a dataset for analysis. Data from the
NBHS have been proven to be reliable and predictable
[29]. The first author MBH examined each disciplinary
action and corresponded with the NBHS if data were
missing. MBH anonymized the dataset by replacing
names of clinics and hospitals with a centrality index
number [24] based on the geographic location. Every
municipality in Norway has a centrality index number
from 1 (most central) to 6 (least central). In the present
study, we merged two consecutive index numbers (see
Results) to represent urban areas (centrality index 1–2),
semi-urban areas (centrality index 3–4) and rural areas
(centrality index 5–6). The complete dataset contained
13 variables including registration date, issue date of the
disciplinary action, type of action, speciality of the recipi-
ent physician and workplace centrality index number at
the time of the medical error. The cause of the disciplin-
ary action was not available due to privacy regulations.
There were ten different types of physicians included in
the dataset: 1) GPs in general practice, 2) GPs in emer-
gency primary care clinics, 3) nursing home doctors, 4)
private specialists, 5) medical interns, 6) junior hospital
doctors, 7) senior hospital consultants, 8) company doc-
tors, 9) other doctors and 10) licensed medical students.
Data analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the dataset.
MBH performed frequency counts and cross-tabulation
of variables to calculate annual frequency and distribu-
tion of disciplinary actions. We specified linear regres-
sion models (Y = a + bX) to analyse for significant trends
in actions over time (Yi = actions in year i, Xi = year i, i =
1,…8). Rates of disciplinary actions were calculated per
1000 physicians. Comparative rate analysis was per-
formed by basic division. Statistics Norway, the Norwe-
gian Medical Association and the Norwegian Directorate
of Health provided activity data and information on ser-
vices. Geographical distribution of doctors was only
available for GPs. Because of privacy considerations,
cases involving suspension and revocation of
specialization licences (n = 4) were not further analysed.
Furthermore, doctors disciplined outside Norway (n =
110) were not analysed. We considered GPs in general
practice, GPs working in emergency primary care clinics
and nursing home doctors as representing primary care
doctors, while junior hospital doctors and senior hospital
consultants were grouped as secondary care doctors.
The data were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics 26
(IBM Corp. Statistics 26, SPSS Inc. 2019, USA).
Results
The NBHS provided a dataset of 953 disciplinary ac-
tions. Three of these (0.4%) lacked geographic location
and were thus excluded from the analysis.
Annual frequency
Table 1 shows the annual and total frequencies of dis-
ciplinary actions for physicians by the NBHS in the
study period. A total of 950 disciplinary actions were
Fig. 1 From medical malpractice to disciplinary action
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taken, and 57% of these were warnings, while 36% in-
volved the revocation or restriction of a licence.
Trends
For GPs (Fig. 2) none of the linear regression models
showed statistically significant time trends: total number
of disciplinary actions (b = 2.58, p = .41), warnings (b =
1.07, p = .58), loss of prescription rights (b = −.18, p =
.65), and revocation/restriction of licence (b = 1.7, p =
.12). A similar analysis for secondary care doctors (Fig. 3)
also revealed no significant time trends; total number of
disciplinary actions (b = − 0,49, p = .57), warnings (b =
−.50, p = .36), loss of prescription rights (b = −.12, p =
.68), and revocation/restriction of licence (b = .13, p =
.68).
Total and geographical distribution
Table 2 presents the distribution of disciplinary actions
given between 2011 and 2018 to different types of
doctors. The presentation only includes disciplinary ac-
tions originating from Norway. Primary care physicians
were given 70% of all warnings, 79% of all losses of pre-
scription rights and 57% of revocations/restrictions of li-
cences. For secondary care physicians, the respective
numbers were 16, 9 and 27%. Other categories of doc-
tors accounted for 14, 11 and 16%, respectively.
Table 3 presents the total number of disciplinary ac-
tions by centrality of the GP’s workplace municipality.
Table 4 shows the rates of actions for the same GPs.
Rural GPs received 1.7 times more disciplinary ac-
tions than their urban colleagues (148.9/88.4). For the
most serious type of action, rural GPs had their li-
cence revoked or restricted 2.1 times more frequently
than GPs in urban areas (47.4/22.5). Regarding the
type of disciplinary action linked to unprofessional
handling of medication, urban GPs had 2.1 times
more cases of loss of prescription rights than rural
GPs (8.4/4.1).




















Warning 59 (61) 71 (59) 64 (62) 54 (55) 99 (62) 62 (57) 58 (47) 78 (56) 545 (57)
Licence restricted 6 (6) 7 (6) 7 (7) 6 (6) 14 (9) 10 (9) 12 (10) 10 (7) 72 (8)
Loss of prescription right 7 (7) 12 (10) 7 (7) 6 (6) 8 (5) 7 (6) 7 (6) 7 (5) 61 (6)
Licence revoked 23 (24) 30 (25) 25 (24) 32 (33) 38 (24) 28 (26) 47 (38) 45 (32) 269 (28)
Suspension/loss of specialization
approval
2 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (0)
Total 97 (100) 120 (100) 103 (100) 98 (100) 160 (100) 108 (100) 124 (100) 140 (100) 950 (100)
Fig. 2 Trends in disciplinary actions over time for GPs in Norway (2011–2018)
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Rates and organizational factors
Table 5 presents the rates of disciplinary actions per
1000 doctors among different categories of doctors. GPs
received the most actions at 98.7 per 1000. A warning
was given 2.4 times more frequently than revocation
or restriction of the licence. GPs in general practice
received 1.6 times more disciplinary actions than GPs
in emergency primary care clinics and 3.7 times more
disciplinary actions than nursing home doctors. Pri-
vate specialists received the second highest proportion
of disciplinary actions, and the most actions per con-
sultation. Private specialists were also the group with
the highest proportion of doctors with a specialization
degree.
Fig. 3 Trends in disciplinary actions over time for secondary care doctors in Norway (2011–2018)














307 (57) 33 (77) 126 (49) 1 (25) 467
GPs in emergency
clinics
58 (11) 0 (0) 16 (6) 0 (0) 74
Nursing home
doctors
9 (2) 1 (2) 4 (2) 0 (0) 14
Secondary care doctors
Junior doctors 16 (3) 1 (2) 19 (7) 0 (0) 36
Senior consultants 70 (13) 3 (7) 51 (20) 1
(25)
125
Other types of doctors
Private specialists 59 (11) 4 (9) 26 (10) 0 (0) 89
Medical interns 5 (1) 1 (2) 2 (1) 0 (0) 8
Company doctors 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 1 (25) 1
Other doctors 11 (2) 0 13 (5) 1 (25) 25
Licensed medical
students
0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 1
Total n (%) 535 (100) 43 (100) 258 (100) 4 (100) 840a
a110 disciplinary actions occurred outside Norway
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In hospitals, senior consultants received the most dis-
ciplinary actions. Per 1000 senior consultants, 17.0 re-
ceived a disciplinary action. Junior doctors received 6.4
disciplinary actions per 1000 doctors, 2.7 times fewer
than senior consultants.
The rate comparisons between primary and secondary
care doctors revealed that primary care doctors received
8.0 times more disciplinary actions than secondary care
doctors. Further, primary care doctors received a warn-
ing 10.6 times more often, had their licence revoked or
restricted 4.6 times more often and lost their prescrip-
tion rights 14.8 times more often than secondary care
doctors. Rural GPs, the group with most disciplinary ac-
tions per 1000 physicians (148.9), received such actions
8.7 times more frequently than senior consultants and
23.3 times more frequently than junior doctors.
Discussion
In this study, we investigated the distribution and fre-
quency of disciplinary actions given to physicians in
Norway between 2011 and 2018. Our findings reveal
considerable differences. One of the core findings in this
study is that rural GPs had the highest rate of disciplin-
ary actions among all physicians. Furthermore, GPs and
private specialists had higher rates than other groups of
physicians. Because a disciplinary action is a sign of
medical malpractice and a possible indicator of problems
related to patient safety, we will discuss our findings in
the context of the research aims.
Organizational and systemic factors
According to our findings, physicians who work in small
clinics or alone (GPs and private specialists) had
respectively 4.3 and 3.9 times higher rates of disciplinary
actions than those working in large organizations (hos-
pital doctors). This difference may partly be explained
by the supervisory system of the NBHS. Based on its
system-wide perspective of patient safety [6, 15, 16, 30–
32], the NBHS seeks to identify systemic causes as a pri-
mary goal when a medical error occurs [33]. The theory
is that addressing a single systemic error will be more ef-
ficient in benefitting more future patients than reacting
to a single medical error, thus enhancing health care ser-
vices for the future. Many individuals are involved in
health care in hospitals, while in general practice and
private specialist clinics, much of the organization is de
facto the physician. For example, an acutely ill patient
arriving at hospital would interact with a large group of
health care workers before diagnosis and treatment were
initiated. If the same patient came to a GP clinic or a
private specialist, he or she would interact with a health
care secretary and one GP or one private specialist.
Thus, clinical decisions and patient responsibility clearly
vary between these two contexts. Despite providing very
different types of health care, GPs and private specialists
have almost identical frequencies of disciplinary actions.
The apparent focus of the NBHS on system causality
and the lack of system protection in primary care make
GPs and private specialists more vulnerable to disciplin-
ary actions.
More disciplinary actions for rural GPs
Comparing the GPs in our study, we found that rural
GPs received 1.7 times more disciplinary actions than
their urban counterparts. A Danish study reported no
statistically significant association between litigation
Table 3 Total numbers of disciplinary actions for GPs by type of action and centrality of workplace municipality, 2011–2018
a Warning Loss of prescription rights Licence revoked or restricted Total
Urban GPs 110 16 43 169
Semi-urban GPs 125 14 48 187
Rural GPs 72 3 35 111
Total 307 33 126 467
aAverage number of GPs (2016–2018) split by centrality index https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/12720/tableViewLayout1/
Table 4 Rates of disciplinary actions per 1000 GPs by type of action and centrality of the workplace municipality, 2011–2018








Urban GPs 57.5 8.4 22.5 88.4 2.9 ∗ 105 68
Semi-urban
GPs
60.3 6.8 23.2 90.3 2.6 ∗ 105 190
Rural GPs 97.4 4.1 47.4 148.9 1.2 ∗ 105 170
aAverage number of GPs (2016–2018) split by centrality index https://www.s00sb.no/statbank/table/12720/tableViewLayout1/
bTotal number of consultations (2011–2018) by GPs in each workplace municipality. Data provided on request by Statistics Norway
cReport “New Centrality Index for Municipalities”, Statistics Norway, 2017, ISBN 978-82-537-9627-7, Oslo
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figures and rurality [19], although Australian researchers
found more patient complaints [20] in this context.
Rural GP clinics face challenges in care provision in
terms of accessibility, limited health care services, use of
locums and issues related to vast distances and transpor-
tation [34, 35]. Rural patients have been found to report
lower levels of relational continuity [35]. In a recent
interview-based study on rural general practice patients,
we found that patients were more willing to accept mis-
takes and errors by their regular GP than by locum GPs
[36]. If we assume that continuity of care is an important
quality indicator of health care [32], one hypothesis is
that the use of locums or GPs on short-term contracts
[37] results in more cases of medical malpractice in rural
areas. Another possible explanation is that being located
far from hospitals may affect rural GPs’ clinical decisions
[38]. Furthermore, rural GPs see, almost exclusively, all
the acutely ill patients, whereas in urban areas, more
specialists are available, and these patients can bypass
GPs by being taken by ambulance directly to hospital.
Many rural GPs work frequent shifts in emergency pri-
mary care units, possibly resulting in fatigue, sleep
deprivation and cognitive overload, all of which are risk
factors for committing errors [39].
Strengths and limitations
Using the NBHS national database for analysis, all dis-
ciplinary actions were processed equally and uniformly
at a national centre, avoiding different types of selection
or affective bias. The datasets from the NBHS and Statis-
tics Norway were complete and trustworthy, providing
the opportunity for a nationwide analysis and new
knowledge.
Table 5 Rates of disciplinary actions per 1000 doctors, and actions per 1 million consultations, by type of action and doctor. 2011–
2018


























16.9 1.9 7.5 26.3 533
Secondary care doctors 11,026,425 1.82
Junior
doctors
2.8 0.2 3.4 6.4 5601 10.9
Senior
consultants
9.6 0.4 7.0 17.0 7312 94.6
Other types of doctors
Private
specialists
60.3 4.1 26.6 91.0 2,006,196 6.04 978 99.6
Medical
interns
6.2 1.2 2.4 9.8 817
aAverage number (2016–2018) of consultations by GPs in general practice, GPs in emergency clinics and nursing home doctors (estimated using 4 contacts/bed/
year) https://www.ssb.no/helse/statistikker/fastlegetj & https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/10903/ & https://www.ssb.no/pleie/
bAverage number (2016–2018) of contacts in somatic and psychiatric hospitals. https://statistikk.helsedirektoratet.no/bi/Dashboard/37f4e0dd-61fd-4846-a7c1-
d87553ce2c1a?e=false&vo=viewonly
& https://www.helsedirektoratet.no/rapporter/aktivitetsdata-for-psykisk-helsevern-for-voksne-og-tverrfaglig-spesialisert-rusbehandling
cAverage number (2016–2018) of contacts for private specialists. https://www.helsedirektoratet.no/rapporter/aktivitetsdata-for-avtalespesialister
dAverage number of GP contacts between 2016 and 2018. Source: https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/12720/
eFull-time equivalent GPs in emergency primary care centres. Report from National Register 2018, National Centre for Emergency Primary Health Care, Tone
Morken, Norway
fAverage number of physicians employed in nursing homes and institutions in 2011 and 2013–2017. From the report “Physicians in primary and secondary care”,
2018, IS-2789, OSLO: Norwegian Directorate of Health
gAverage number of licensed specialists between 2011 and 2018. Source: https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/03750
hAverage number of working physicians < 70 years, 2011–2018. Source: physician statistics, Norwegian Medical
Association: https://legeforeningen.no/Emner/Andre-emner/Legestatistikk/Yrkesaktive-leger-i-Norge/Stillingsgrupper/
iAverage number of medical interns employed between 2013 and 2017. From the report “Physicians in primary and secondary care”, 2018, IS-2789, OSLO:
Norwegian Directorate of Health
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The 950 disciplinary actions must, however, be inter-
preted in the context of approximately 230 million pa-
tient contacts that occurred between 2011 and 2018.
Our findings do not represent all occurrences of medical
malpractice in Norway. There is a possibility of selection
bias, as some serious complaints could have been ad-
dressed by the local chief county medical officer instead
of being forwarded to the NBHS [40]. In the present
study, we addressed some external and system factors af-
fecting disciplinary actions, keeping in mind a famous
quote of Donabedian: ‘Systems…are enabling mecha-
nisms only. It is the ethical dimension of individuals that
is essential to a system’s success’.
Implications for practice
Our findings demonstrate the potentially vulnerable pos-
ition of doctors working alone and in small clinics. The
organizational and systemic factors designed to support
doctors may be weak in some of the small rural clinics
where the disciplinary actions were the most frequent.
There seems to be an unexploited potential to improve
patient safety by offering doctors in these clinics a stron-
ger support system. There was a marked difference be-
tween primary and secondary care doctors in the rates
of disciplinary actions given, indicating a higher degree
of system protection in secondary care facilities.
Future research should analyse other types of data,
and include case studies and in-depth qualitative studies
to investigate why GPs, especially rural GPs, are more
frequently disciplined.
Conclusions
There are clear differences in the distribution and fre-
quency of disciplinary actions given by the NBHS to
physicians working in different health care settings. Pri-
vate specialists and GPs, especially those working in
rural clinics, received the most disciplinary actions.
These results warrant the attention of health care leaders
responsible for ensuring patient safety. Hopefully they
will be inspired to initiate further studies to identify the
main factors influencing medical malpractice. The re-
sults of this study may also assist supervisory authorities
in their quality assessments to determine whether their
disciplinary system is efficient and adequate for all the
different categories of physicians working in health care
in Norway.
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